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A B S T R A C T
In fast-paced and knowledge-intensive environments, licensing partnerships can be powerful levers for market
expansion. Research on the management of technology-oriented licenses has nonetheless pointed out the risks of
corrosive disputes caused by conflicting interests or misunderstandings among licensing partners. The choice
made ex ante on mechanisms for resolving potential disputes is of prime importance in the execution of licensing
exchanges. Although the legal literature has widely emphasized the advantages of arbitration towards litigation,
public ordering remains the “default” option in managers’ eyes. By adopting a transaction cost economics logic,
our study explores the conditions under which licensing partners may prefer arbitration over public ordering
during the contractual-design phase. In accordance with our theoretical arguments, findings show that the oc-
currence of arbitration provisions increases when the coordination orientation adopted by licensing partners is
extensive. In situations where both monitoring and coordination orientations are simultaneously extensive,
results reveal a greater propensity to prefer arbitration over public ordering. Our research therefore supports the
view that corporate decision-makers tend to favor the conciliatory stance and compromising awards typically
associated with arbitration, only when exchanges are expected to be highly coordinative. Their preference for
arbitration over litigation is magnified when the coordination orientation develops alongside the monitoring
orientation.
1. Introduction
Due to the risks of knowledge misappropriation (Arora and Fosfuri,
2000; Oxley, 1997; Teece, 1986) and the uncertainties surrounding the
commercialization and implementation of non-proprietary technology
(Nelson and Winter, 1982; Pisano, 1989), managing licensing ex-
changes requires anticipation of conflicting interests and of potential
corrosive disputes. It is essential to craft appropriate remedies for mi-
tigating those disputes. In this regard, the choice of dispute-resolution
mechanisms made at the outset of licensing exchanges can play a key
strategic role in the governance of the partnership by disciplining li-
censing partners’ behavior and enforcing their contractual commit-
ments. Scholars in law have highlighted the numerous advantages of
referring disputes, and especially disputes on technological matters, to
arbitration rather than public courts (e.g., Arnold et al., 1991; Mills,
1996). Despite the various advantages of arbitration, prior empirical
studies have provided evidence that arbitration provisions are not
systematically included in inter-firm partnerships (Drahozal and
Hylton, 2003; Eisenberg and Miller, 2007; Hagedoorn and Hesen,
2009). Managers do not seem to consider this private mechanism as a
“default” option and tend instead to favor public litigation (Hylton,
2005; Stipanowich, 2014).
Our study primarily aims at understanding this paradox by ex-
amining managers’ rationality and their decision criteria when asses-
sing alternative ordering systems. We develop and propose a systematic
and empirical framework, grounded in the transaction cost perspective,
which predicts the conditions under which the advantages of public
courts overcome those of arbitration from a managerial point of view.
In technology-oriented licensing, partners are torn between safe-
guarding the appropriation value and openly collaborating. They face
these same contradicting imperatives when assessing the ordering sys-
tems. On the one hand, the expectation of severe damages and coercive
awards is essential for disciplining the exchange and sanctioning de-
viation from contractual obligations. On the other hand, more nuanced
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settlements and a win-win stance signal a willingness to “work things
out” and to foster realignment of each party’s actions and interests
beyond disputes (Lumineau and Oxley, 2012). Although arbitration can
be valuable because it enables partners to accommodate adaptation ex
post in an amicable way (Friedman, 1965; Williamson, 1979), it may be
perceived as ill-suited and not coercive enough in managers’ eyes due to
its conciliatory approach (Drahozal and Ware, 2010; Stipanowich and
Lamare, 2014). To unravel how partners balance the features of public
ordering and arbitration, we therefore endeavor to disentangle control
concerns from coordination concerns. We appraise the threat of op-
portunism as perceived by decision-makers through the inclusion of
monitoring provisions in licensing contracts. Requirements for colla-
boration and interdependent actions ex post are evaluated based on the
extent of coordination provisions included in those contracts.
We contend that, from a managerial point of view, public courts
may be perceived as more suitable in situations where moral hazards
and risks of knowledge and asset misappropriation are salient. Judges’
awards tend to be more severe than arbitrators’ awards (Macneil, 1974,
1978; Williamson, 1985). Legal scholars and practitioners acknowledge
the conciliatory and win-win stance usually adopted by arbitrators
(Friedman, 1965; Stipanowich and Lamare, 2014). Such a stance may
not be favorable or suitable in situations where concerns for opportu-
nism prevail. It can however be sought when the licensing partnership
involves significant inter-partner coordination over time. To test our
arguments, we assembled a detailed survey sample of technology li-
censing exchanges for which we collected data on technology-based
and exchange attributes, contract design and the selected dispute-re-
solution mechanism. Our empirical findings reveal first that arbitration
is favored in the presence of an extensive coordination orientation that
reflects the need for joint efforts and interdependencies. In contrast, our
findings do not provide evidence of a direct impact of a monitoring
orientation on firms’ preference for public courts. However, as expected
we do find that the willingness to “work things out” amicably and to
benefit from the expertise of arbitral judges overcomes possible needs
for severe sanctions when licensing contracts are simultaneously char-
acterized by significant monitoring and coordination orientations.
Stated differently, in highly collaborative licensing exchanges, the
monitoring provisions tend to magnify rather than inhibit partners’
preferences for arbitration over litigation.
Our study first contributes to the remarkably scant research on
dispute-resolution choices in the managerial and organizational litera-
ture. Lumineau and Malhotra (2011), Malhotra and Lumineau (2011)
and Lumineau and Oxley (2012) examined actual dispute-resolution
choices once disputes surface. By focusing on decisions made ex ante, it
is possible to study the extent to which partner firms perceive either
public courts or arbitration as more suitable for inducing appropriate
behaviors ex post, and for handling conflicts that could arise along the
way.
We also contribute to research that distinguishes the control func-
tions of contractual agreements from the coordination functions (e.g.,
Gulati and Singh, 1998). Our study explores their joint influence, in
particular. We show that contracts with an arbitration provision are
projected to be of a “coordinative” nature ex post, while those referring
exclusively to public courts are simple exchanges, typically executed
under the shadow of severe possible sanctions in case of non-com-
pliance. We explore a case of “trilateral governance” (i.e., the licensor,
the licensee, and the arbitrator) as introduced by Williamson (1979).
Since the evocation of third parties by Williamson (1979), the con-
tribution provided by those parties in exchanges has received extremely
limited attention (Nooteboom, 1999). Our study expands on the pro-
position that arbitrators act as gap fillers and help to ensure con-
tinuation of the exchange beyond disputes.
2. Theory and hypotheses
2.1. Why include an arbitration provision in partnership contracts? A
review of key arguments for the selection of the dispute-resolution
mechanism
Public courts and contract law are key institutions that allow vo-
luntary exchanges to take place. They provide general rules that shape
post-contractual behaviors and they induce parties to credibly commit
to their contractual obligations by imposing legal sanctions (Cooter and
Rubinfeld, 1989; Llewellyn, 1931). Despite the support offered by
public institutions, transaction cost economics disputes the assertion
that public ordering is efficacious in empowering any contract. Under
certain conditions, contracting parties may prefer arbitration. Arbitra-
tion has long been recognized as a private resolution mechanism that
may temper tensions when disputes arise (Bonn, 1972). The arbitral
forum is essentially outside the public legal system (Friedman, 1965),
and it provides an alternative set of rules and enforcement procedures
(Hylton, 2005).
Arbitrators are selected on the basis of their expertise in the focal
subject matter (Bernstein, 2001; Bonn, 1972; Sternlight and Resnik,
2005), as well as their reputation for integrity and fairness
(Stipanowich and Lamare, 2014). Parties can also decide on the site of
dispute resolution, the laws that will govern their dispute, the number
of arbitrators, and the process by which arbitrators are appointed
(Leeson, 2008). Arbitrators are not bound by the usual courtroom rules
of evidence nor by legal precedent. They often reach a decision re-
garding a particular dispute based on the norms of fair commercial
practice and trade customs (Bonn, 1972).
Arbitration is therefore typically characterized as more flexible than
the public system (Coulson, 1965). Parties voluntarily decide to refer
their dispute to at least one impartial third person and agree to be
bound by the decision of that person. A losing party has little leeway to
appeal (Bonn, 1972). Given the limited possibility of appeal, arbitration
tends to compare favorably with public court litigation in terms of
speed and economy (Bonn, 1972; Drahozal, 2008; Pinkham and Peng,
2017).1 In addition, as arbitration is a private process, it makes un-
favorable publicity less likely.
In contractual exchanges, tensions and disputes can emanate from
two main categories of impediments: opportunistic behaviors
(Williamson, 1985), or misunderstandings and collaboration failures
(Gulati et al., 2005). In terms of alleviating opportunism ex post, part-
ners may perceive the public system as more dissuasive than arbitra-
tion. Indeed, public judges tend to adopt a more adversarial position
and to deliver severe punitive damages (Cooter and Rubinfeld, 1989).
The adversarial mindset, in which each party tries to win as much of the
stakes as possible, prevails in trials. The efficacy of public systems in
allocating the responsibility for performance shortfalls depends how-
ever on judges’ abilities to verify the information related to the ex-
change and to ascertain whether the disputing parties have acted in
accordance with the contractual terms (Greif, 2005; Williamson, 1985).
The information required for making such a judgment may not be
readily accessible in public courts.
Although the threat of adjudicating possible disputes through public
courts can discipline behaviors and mitigate the occurrence of disputes
overall (Shavell, 1995), litigation may not be perceived as suitable for
exchanges calling for fruitful and smooth collaboration beyond dis-
putes. In this regard Macneil (1962, p. 525) noted that “arbitration is
often a more satisfactory system for handling alleged breaches if the
contractual relations of the parties are of a continuing nature.” Arbi-
trators have a tendency to evenly allocate responsibilities for damages
rather than offering total victory to one party. Also, given the expertise
1 Speed and cost effectiveness are also explained by the fact that arbitrators have dif-
ferent incentives from judges when resolving disputes (Drahozal and Hylton, 2003).
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of arbitrators as well as the flexibility offered by arbitration proceed-
ings, arbitrators may deliver more nuanced outcomes than a judge
(Bernstein, 2001; Drahozal and Hylton, 2003). As stated by Johnson
et al. (2002), arbitrators can base their decisions on information that
might not be admissible in public courts, such as the firms’ behaviors
over time and probabilistic patterns. Although arbitration may be
viewed as appropriate for adjusting an exchange ex post and filling
possible contractual gaps, damage measures may be perceived as less
satisfactory (Bernstein, 2001).
Consequently, the two fora do not share the same presumption of
exchange continuity beyond disputes, and they differ in their ability to
deliver a settlement. Such discrepancies explain the link between public
ordering and simple exchanges. First, in simple and discrete exchanges,
there are no significant relations that need to be preserved beyond
possible disputes. By definition, partner identity is treated as irrelevant
and resources can be readily deployed to other exchanges (Klein et al.,
1978; Williamson, 1991). Second, in such exchanges, the information
needed for settling disputes is likely to be readily accessible to courts
and disputes can be resolved on the basis of the contract’s content.
Therefore, defection from the original agreement can often be effi-
ciently deterred by public courts and their promise of legal sanctions
(Macneil, 1962; Williamson, 1991).
Establishing the greater perceived suitability of one resolution me-
chanism over the other is more difficult when exchanges are of a more
relational nature, however. In what follows, we theoretically explore
how contractual orientations adopted by licensing partners in response
to anticipated moral hazards and coordination challenges are likely to
influence the choice of dispute-resolution mechanism.
2.2. The choice of arbitration in licensing contracts: research hypotheses
Licensing is a particular type of collaboration, characterized by an
important asymmetry in the nature of partners’ contributions and of
their moral hazards (Arora, 1995; Aulakh et al., 1998). It offers the
advantage of employing valuable complementary assets owned by a
firm – the licensee – in the commercialization and implementation of
another firm’s – the licensor – proprietary technology (Arora and
Ceccagnoli, 2006; Teece, 1986). Like in any other form of partnership,
control and coordination concerns may co-exist. This dichotomy faced
by partners has been widely studied in the literature on inter-organi-
zational exchanges: the fear of misappropriation of assets and knowl-
edge by the trading parties on the one hand; and the difficulties of
fruitfully collaborating and adjusting actions on the other hand (e.g.,
Dekker, 2004; Gulati et al., 2005; White and Lui, 2005). In the pursuit
of desirable outcomes, the choice of dispute-resolution mechanisms –
arbitration versus public court – plays a key role. The two mechanisms
are indeed not equally suited for preventing or handling disputes
caused by control or coordination matters. Our framework therefore
presents appropriation concerns and coordination requirements as
powerful concepts in explaining the choice of dispute-resolution me-
chanisms. We also investigate the effect of their co-existence on the
likelihood of finding an arbitration provision.
2.2.1. Monitoring orientation
In licensing exchanges, moral hazards from the licensor’s point of
view relate mostly to the chances that the licensees “invent around”
patents or misuse confidential information (e.g., Laursen et al., 2017;
Oxley, 1997). If a substantial part of the exchanged knowledge is tacit,
it can be difficult to legally protect against unintended leakage (Oxley,
1997; Teece, 1986). The licensees may also free-ride and contribute less
than agreed on when commercializing the licensed technology (Bergen
et al., 1992). Furthermore, technology may evolve in unexpected ways
and the key performance metrics might change, making pre-specified
targets and benchmarks less relevant. This increases the potential for
shirking, contributing less than agreed, misappropriating resources or
outcomes, or exploiting a superior bargaining position (Aulakh et al.,
1998). On the licensee’s side, great uncertainty can surround the im-
plementation of the technology while important marketing- or manu-
facturing-related specific investments may be required (e.g., Somaya
et al., 2010). Licensees face concerns about whether they will be able to
obtain adequate returns for their valuable complementary assets (Arora
and Ceccagnoli, 2006; Somaya et al., 2010). Specific investments re-
quired to implement the licensed technology pave the way for hold-up
situations (Klein et al., 1978; Williamson, 1985). When technology-
based and exchange attributes make licensing partners particularly
vulnerable to counterparties’ behaviors, provisions aimed at enhancing
compliance with expectations are negotiated (Das and Teng, 2000;
Heide, 1994). Monitoring provisions can focus on the licensees’ per-
formance in terms of technology commercialization, and may also
concern the quality of the products delivered on the market or of the
industrial and R&D installations (Dekker, 2004; Ittner et al., 1999).
Provisions for monitoring behaviors imply reporting and checking ac-
tivities, written notice of any departure from the agreement, accounting
examination, cost control or quality control (Das and Teng, 1998).
While these provisions are costly to draft and implement, they lead to
superior verifiability, and greater ease of demonstrating and penalizing
non-compliance (Carson et al., 2006; Holmström, 1979; Parkhe, 1993).
When partners emphasize explicit monitoring provisions as a means
to deter likely dilatory tactics, incentives are created for firms to defend
their own behaviors and to question the appropriateness of others’ ac-
tions (De Dreu et al., 2006). These provisions enable partners to miti-
gate each other’s tendencies to pursue self-interest (Williamson, 1985).
In such a context, the public court may be perceived as a more suitable
forum for settling possible disputes as it is more inclined than arbitra-
tion to deliver severe settlements and to deter opportunism (Antia et al.,
2013; Drahozal and Hylton, 2003). The prospect of severe damage
awards and termination of the relationship is likely to be needed for
disciplining the exchange and preventing deviation from contractual
obligations when moral hazards are non-negligible. Despite the nu-
merous advantages of arbitration, managers may, therefore, remain
reluctant to agree to it. By choosing litigation, partners increase the
chances of disputes being prevented or severe punitive remedies being
imposed on the wrongdoer if disputes surface. Public courts indeed
place great emphasis on the rights of the parties and advance the in-
terests of the “rightful” parties against the interests of the others. Ar-
bitration offers more regard for parties’ business relationships (Wang,
2014).
Moreover, partners are likely to be confident in the ability of public
judges to deal with disputes thanks to the information collected through
monitoring activities, and the likelihood of early detection of shirking,
misappropriation, or hold-up situations. Although judges may not have
the technical and market expertise of arbitrators, those monitoring
activities give them a privileged access to the information needed to
comprehensively evaluate cases and deliver settlements (i.e., formal
and explicit contractual terms but also documented proof accom-
panying initial contracts). Based on the information collected through
monitoring, they can judge whether or not parties acted in good faith.
To ensure efficient enforcement, it must indeed be certain that public
courts do not excuse parties that could have relatively easily taken
action to avoid violating the contractual commitments (Joskow, 1977).
If not, opportunistic or inefficient risk-taking behaviors might increase.
Consequently, by including monitoring provisions as a means to hinder
devious tactics, licensing partners increase the ability of public courts to
comprehend disputes, and they magnify the chances that the rules of
contract law and the letter of the original contract will be strictly fol-
lowed and enforced (Hylton, 2005; Macneil, 1974, 1978). Hence, we
hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 1. The greater the extent of the monitoring orientation in
licensing contracts, the lower the likelihood of including an arbitration
provision.
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2.2.2. Coordination orientation
As stated earlier, managing moral hazards is only one function of
the licensing contract design. Besides those moral hazards, coordination
challenges become vivid when the licensing transaction implies an
exchange of tacit knowledge or when interdependent tasks are expected
(Gulati and Singh, 1998; Gulati et al., 2005). Licensing exchanges may
sometimes imply significant joint efforts in such areas as R&D, manu-
facturing, and marketing (Hagedoorn et al., 2008). In some cases, the
division of labor is indeed straightforward—the licensor focuses on
technology development and the licensee concentrates on its commer-
cialization (Teece, 1986). However, when licensing goes beyond the
mere granting of the right to use a patent, interfaces and processes for
decomposing tasks and coordinating interactions are needed (Artz and
Brush, 2000). These interfaces tend to be unique and specific to the
focal exchange (Mesquita and Brush, 2008). Also, adjustments in each
party’s actions, possibly due to changing conditions or needs among the
parties, may be required over time. “Cognitive” limitations in the
transfer of technology to another organizational context impose sig-
nificant costs and adaptation (Arora and Gambardella, 1994). In order
to pursue desirable outcomes and overcome collaboration failures,
provisions may serve to offer a framework for communication and in-
teraction. Firms tend to respond to the expected need for coordination
by crafting provisions aimed at devising ways for effecting transfers
(Mellewigt et al., 2007; Reuer and Ariño, 2007), exchanging informa-
tion (Argyres and Mayer, 2007), or engaging in joint planning (Carson
et al., 2006). These provisions are used to coordinate tasks across or-
ganizational boundaries through planning, program rules and standard
operating procedures (Gulati, 1995; Gulati and Singh, 1998; White,
2005). They can also define some of the cornerstones of licensing
partners’ communication, such as frequency, timeline and content
(Anderson and Dekker, 2005). By doing so, coordination provisions
promote the development of common knowledge and homogeneous
expectations (Faems et al., 2008; Mooi and Ghosh, 2010). Protocols and
decision mechanisms can be designed to achieve concerted actions.
They foster the recognition of changes in exchange conditions, and the
generation of coordination responses to such changes.
Despite efforts to guard against future contingencies that could
threaten cooperation, exchanges can still become the subject of disputes
(Mohr and Spekman, 1994). Given the relational specificity implied by
extensive coordination and the sunk costs such coordination represents,
the presumption of an exchange’s continuity that prevails while settling
disputes in a private forum should drive a preference for arbitration.
Arbitrators tend to approach disputes in the spirit of compromise
(Drahozal and Ware, 2010; Williamson, 1985), and they can tailor
settlements not only to foster the realignment of interests but also to
result in the adjustment of each party’s actions. Moreover, arbitration
enables partner firms to avoid unfavorable publicity about disputes or
leaks of confidential information (Macneil, 1962), and to circumvent
the delays that are endemic to court proceedings (Perlman and Nelson,
1983). These latter characteristics should be highly valued by partners
engaging in an exchange that involves extensive coordination.
A higher occurrence of arbitration can also be explained by the
difficulties associated with drafting express provisions for close inter-
actions (Grossman and Hart, 1983; Hadfield, 1994). The required level
of care and effort needed for fruitful coordination can hardly be covered
by precise contract terms. In fact, somewhat vague terms, such as “best
efforts” and “reasonableness,” are commonly used (Hagedoorn and
Hesen, 2009). Thanks to their expertise, arbitrators should be perceived
as better equipped than public judges to interpret implied and difficult-
to-contract aspects. While arbitrators are not always industry experts,
they tend to be more industry savvy than public judges (Drahozal,
2008). Furthermore, the flexibility of the arbitration proceedings en-
ables them to consider evidence concerning business trends or the
quality of outputs (Sternlight and Resnik, 2005), and to reach a decision
based on trade customs (Bonn, 1972). Therefore, we hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 2. The greater the extent of the coordination orientation in
licensing contracts, the greater the likelihood of including an
arbitration provision.
2.2.3. Joint effects of monitoring and coordination orientations
Since monitoring and coordination orientations are expected to in-
fluence the propensity to rely on arbitration in opposite ways, one may
wonder which of the two effects will prevail when both types of pro-
visions are extensively used in a licensing contract. It is not rare to find
exchanges where in addition to incentive conflicts or the threat of
knowledge leakage, failures of adaptation arise as partners read and
react to signals differently (Williamson, 1991). It can then happen that
extensive monitoring and coordination provisions are simultaneously
included in licensing contracts to deter opportunism and facilitate
collaboration. Prior studies on contractual governance show that co-
ordination provisions tend to foster behavioral norms of flexibility,
solidarity and information exchanges (Poppo and Zenger, 2002). Flex-
ibility and solidarity enable firms to grant concessions in the short term
more often, as any resulting imbalances are expected to be adjusted and
reciprocated in the longer term (Dore, 1983). Norms of information
exchange concerning actions and plans foster intention transparency.
The licensor should therefore worry less about spending time and re-
sources on monitoring and checking whether the licensing partner is
fulfilling its contractual commitments (Dyer and Chu, 2003). However,
in the presence of extensive coordination provisions, we observe in
reality that monitoring provisions may still be included. An important
know-how sharing or manufacturing/marketing assistance requirement
indeed gives partners more opportunities for misappropriating new
skills or gleaning trade secrets.
As highlighted in prior studies (Dekker, 2004; Mesquita and Brush,
2008), the effects of monitoring provisions may vary with the magni-
tude of the coordination concerns expected. Rather than essentially
being used for easing coercive solutions, clearly articulated monitoring
provisions may inspire the confidence necessary for close collaboration.
They narrow the severity and domain of risk (Poppo and Zenger, 2002)
and guarantee objectivity and provision of a track record of the other’s
performance, behaviors and skills (Das and Teng, 1998). When mon-
itoring provisions are extensive, licensing partners may therefore be
more willing to closely collaborate and to overcome their cognitive
limitations.
In highly coordinative exchanges, the market and technical ex-
pertise of the arbitrators is likely to be highly valued as they are ex-
pected to intelligently and comprehensively judge possible dilatory
behaviors. Even if the monitoring contractual orientation tends a priori
to suggest suspicion of hidden agendas, public courts may not be well-
equipped to guarantee the fairness and correctness of punitive damages
due to the relational nature of the exchange and the contractual gaps
(Greif, 2005; Williamson, 1985). This is broadly explained by the
court’s formal and inflexible proceedings and the lack of expertise re-
quired for interpreting and executing coordination-related terms. Major
delays associated with public litigation are also expected to occur given
the complexity of the exchange at stake (Perlman and Nelson, 1983).
These delays may jeopardize the inter-partner relationship overall.
Arbitration should therefore be preferred over litigation when both
monitoring and coordination orientations are highly present. It better
preserves the continuity of highly collaborative exchanges beyond
disputes. This line of thought aligns with research suggesting that, in
highly coordinative exchanges, control provisions are used for facil-
itating collaboration rather than instilling an adversarial and punitive
stance. For coordination to succeed and effective adaptation to take
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place, obtaining extensive rights to monitor partners’ actions, behaviors
and outputs may be a prerequisite (Baker et al., 1994; Gulati et al.,
2005). Hence:
Hypothesis 3. The greater the extent of the monitoring and
coordination orientations in licensing contracts, the greater the
likelihood of including an arbitration provision.
3. Methods
3.1. Sampling and data collection
We obtained data from a survey on technology licensing. In order to
identify a target population for the survey, we relied on a list provided
by Agoria, the Belgian trade association for technology-oriented firms.2
The list contained 1946 firms that were members or non-members of
the association. We conducted an exploratory study, including six semi-
structured field interviews, with Agoria’s representatives prior to ad-
ministering the questionnaire.3 Given its high level of legitimacy among
technology-oriented firms in Belgium and the size of its membership,
Agoria’s support positively influenced the response rate (Dillman,
2007).
Agoria helped us identify key informants, as the association reg-
ularly updates its list of contacts and their positions. Questionnaires
were sent to each contact deemed relevant for our study. We explicitly
asked each executive to redirect the questionnaire if he or she felt that
other individuals in the organization were more knowledgeable on the
subject of licensing. Our electronic survey package included a letter that
was written, signed, and sent by Agoria, as well as a customized cover
letter. Two to five follow-up messages per firm were transmitted by
email and phone. The use of key informants is considered an appro-
priate method for obtaining data on inter-organizational exchanges due
to the absence of detailed information in secondary data sources and
the confidential nature of contractual information in general (e.g.,
Carson, 2007). In order to reduce single-informant bias, we asked re-
spondents to indicate their function (e.g., chief executive officer, chief
financial officer, R&D department manager, intellectual property (IP)
department manager, or legal department head). From these functions,
we can infer that the informants were well positioned to provide the
requested information (Kumar et al., 1993).
To build our questionnaire, we used Dillman’s (2007) total design
method. We first relied on items developed in previous studies on al-
liances and licensing (e.g., Artz and Brush, 2000; Aulakh et al., 1998;
Bessy and Brousseau, 1998; Parkhe, 1993; Provan and Skinner, 1989),
which we adapted when necessary on the basis of pre-testing discus-
sions and interviews with managers, lawyers, technology-oriented
consultants, Agoria representatives, and other academics. In order to
encourage responses, we followed up with supplemental phone calls
(Dillman, 2007), and respondents were assured of confidentiality and
access to the study’s findings. The initial response rate was 14.8% (289
responses). In 171 surveys, the respondents noted that their firms had
not negotiated licensing contracts. However, the other 118 surveys
were completed by respondents who indicated that their firms had
engaged in technology licensing. We asked these respondents to answer
the rest of the questions based on a technology licensing agreement that
was still active and representative of the licensing activities conducted
by their firms. This approach is consistent with other scholars’ attempts
to build detailed databases on inter-organizational partnerships (e.g.,
Simonin, 2004). After accounting for responses with missing data, the
final sample consists of 106 licensing transactions. The 106 responses
used in our statistical analyses refer to a total of 89 firms. The firms in
our sample are of various sizes: 34.0% have 100 or less employees;
25.4% have between 101 and 500 employees; and 40.6% have more
than 500 employees. Licensing activities typically relate to metal pro-
ducts (13.2%), electronic products, machinery and equipment (44.3%)
and ICT services (13.2%). Contracts are mostly international: 55.7% are
European and 27.4% involve North American partners. The partners are
Japanese in seven cases; Chinese in three cases; and Thai, Russian,
Pakistani, Australian, or Algerian in the remaining cases. The sample
includes eight cases of domestic (Belgian) licensing contracts. Experi-
ence in licensing is also diverse: 15.7% of respondent firms have only
negotiated out-licensing, 48.3% have only negotiated in-licensing, and
36.0% have negotiated both types of licensing. Moreover, 34.8% of the
firms have licensing or IP departments. The questionnaire was com-
pleted by a licensor in 38 cases and by a licensee in 68 cases.4 Differ-
ence of means tests (t-test) provide no evidence of systematic differ-
ences in the way licensors and licensees completed the questionnaire.
To further ascertain that the side – licensor versus licensee – of the re-
spondents would not influence our estimations, we reproduced them by
including a dummy variable equal to one when the respondent was a
licensor and zero otherwise. Findings do not change as a consequence of
this inclusion.
Several tests were performed to ascertain the quality of our data. We
analyzed the potential for response bias by comparing early and late
respondents under the assumption that late respondents are more si-
milar to non-respondents than early respondents are to non-re-
spondents (Armstrong and Overton, 1977). The data collection was
completed within four months. We consider as early responses those
obtained within the first three weeks of the survey administration
(32.2% of our sample). Late responses are those obtained after two
months of data collection (34.0%). Comparative tests for independence
reveal no differences in the sectoral distributions of early and late re-
spondent firms (χ2= 3.2, n.s.) or the geographical distributions of their
licensing partners (χ 2= 22.8, n.s.). In addition, we examined whether
there are any significant differences between early and late respondents
for all of the variables in our models. We found no evidence that our
data are subject to response bias. Furthermore, retrospective biases may
occur: 34 transactions were negotiated up to two years prior to the
survey administration (32.1% of our sample), 57 were negotiated be-
tween three and ten years before the survey administration (53.8%),
and 15 were negotiated more than ten years before the survey admin-
istration (14.2%).5 We performed one-way of variance (ANOVA) with
Bonferroni multiple-comparison tests and compared the means for each
of our model variables obtained in the three license age categories. This
test is selected as our variable (i.e., license age) counts more than two
categories. These tests do not reveal major statistical differences across
the three sub-samples. In order to further control for possible retro-
spective biases, we undertook a Barlett’s test for equal variance.
Overall, the Barlett’s statistics obtained for the model variables confirm
that the assumption of similar variance between the three sub-samples
is not violated. Finally, we control for common method bias by running
a Harman’s one-factor test. After loading all of the items used in our
study into a factor analysis and examining the unrotated factor solution,
2 The sectors represented by the association are: aerospace, industrial automation,
electronics, mechanical and mechatronic engineering, automobiles, metals and materials,
assembly and cranes, plastics, building products, information and communication tech-
nologies, and metal fabrication.
3 Details are available upon request.
4 Some firms participated only as a licensor or as a licensee, while others negotiated
both in- and out-licensing transactions. When the respondent indicated that his/her firm
had exclusively been a licensor, we asked him/her to describe one of the out-licensing
transactions. Similarly, if the firm had exclusively been a licensee, we asked the re-
spondent to select an in-licensing transaction. In situations where the respondent men-
tioned that his/her firm negotiated more out-licensing than in-licensing, he/she was
asked to describe one out-licensing partnership, and vice versa. In cases where firms had
negotiated as many out-licensing partnerships as in-licensing partnerships, the re-
spondent could pick either one or the other. Respondents had the opportunity to describe
more than one licensing partnership if they so desired.
5 Procedural precautions were undertaken by explicitly asking the respondent to “de-
scribe one specific licensing agreement, still active, and representative of the licensing
agreements concluded by their firm.”
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we found that five factors had eigenvalues of more than one and that
14.0% of the variance was explained by the first factor. Cumulatively,
the five factors explained 56.3% of the variance. As no single dominant
factor emerged, this test suggests that common method variance is not a
significant problem in our data (Podsakoff and Organ, 1986).
3.2. Model specification and measurements
3.2.1. Model
We opted for a two-stage regression model enabling us to accom-
modate three main aspects. First, the monitoring and coordination
contractual orientations represent choice variables that are not ran-
domly assigned across the sample. According to the existing literature,
contractual orientations are determined by technology-based and ex-
change attributes. Estimating the influence of monitoring and co-
ordination on the choice of dispute-resolution mechanisms through a
simple probit regression may cause serious endogeneity issues in the
econometrics of contracts (e.g., Mellewigt et al., 2007). Second, deci-
sions on contract design are likely to be made simultaneously (Argyres
et al., 2007; Bercovitz and Tyler, 2014). It is essential to jointly model
those decisions and take the cross-equation correlation of errors into
account (Greene, 2011). Finally, although the three contractual deci-
sions (i.e., monitoring, coordination and arbitration) are determined
during the negotiation phase, our conceptual model suggests a sequence
of matters discussed throughout the negotiation process (Das and Teng,
2001). It positions decisions related to organizing and implementing
the exchange (i.e., monitoring and coordination) before those related to
possible disputes (i.e., arbitration) (Macneil, 1962). This sequence of
matters is consistent with the seminal paper of Macneil (1962) ac-
cording to which there is an important distinction to make between
arbitration provisions and other provisions. It also coincides with the
logic adopted by Lumineau and Henderson (2012) according to which a
cooperative contractual approach favors a “win-win” solution in re-
solving disputes, while an emphasis on safeguards and monitoring rules
allows but also encourages partners to foster their own rights and opt
for severe sanctions.
We employ a two-stage and endogenous model and test a system of
equations simultaneously. The two first-stage equations are jointly
predicted as functions of the transaction characteristics, along with
instrumental variables that help identify the equations (Hamilton and
Nickerson, 2003). In the second-stage equation, we include the same
attributes as those present in the first-stage equations. The propensity to
include arbitration provisions may also be directly impacted by tech-
nology-based and exchange attributes (e.g., Drahozal and Hylton,
2003). However, instruments are omitted in the second-stage equation
to econometrically identify the first-stage equations. Given the need to
jointly model our three equations and allow the error terms to be cor-
related across these equations, we adopt the conditional mixed process
(CMP) estimation developed by Roodman (2011). Since in some cases
we obtained multiple responses per firm, our CMP estimation accounts
for possible interdependencies by clustering observations and using
robust standard errors (Greene, 2011).6
3.2.2. Dependent variable
Arbitration. This variable is equal to one if independent arbitrators
were contractually nominated and/or if both parties contractually
agreed to settle their conflict before a private entity (e.g., chamber of
commerce, sector union, or chamber of arbitration). It is equal to zero
otherwise.
3.2.3. Explanatory variables
The items and contract provisions used to compute the two con-
tractual orientations—monitoring and coordination—were identified in
prior work (e.g., Anderson and Dekker, 2005; Vanneste and Puranam,
2010). They were adapted to the licensing context based on the licen-
sing literature (e.g., Aulakh et al., 2013; Brousseau et al., 2007), and on
pre-testing discussions and interviews. These contract provisions relate
to roles, controls and safeguards, rights assignment, and IP protection
(see Table 1). Survey respondents were asked to indicate whether each
provision was included in the licensing contract.
We use a factor analysis, which enables us to determine whether our
data and the licensing setting fit with the contractual dimensions al-
ready established in prior empirical studies. This dichotomy of provi-
sions builds on prior work (Anderson and Dekker, 2005; Bercovitz and
Tyler, 2014; Lui and Ngo, 2004; Lumineau and Henderson, 2012;
Malhotra and Lumineau, 2011; Mesquita and Brush, 2008; Reuer and
Ariño, 2007; Vanneste and Puranam, 2010). Given the dummy nature
of the contractual provisions, we must determine the tetrachoric cor-
relations between provisions (Schumacker and Beyerlein, 2000). We
provide the results of a principal components factor analysis after an
oblique rotation in Table 1. We opt for promax because the resulting
components may be correlated (Hair et al., 2006). Factors are retained
if their corresponding eigenvalues exceed one. Given our sample size,
factor loadings of 0.60 and higher are considered significant for inter-
pretative purposes (Hair et al., 2006). The factor analysis yields a well-
behaved solution with items typically loading on a single factor. There
are no significant cross-loadings and the loadings are greater than 0.60,
except for one that is equal to 0.54. Two factors are considered, which
together represent 67.0% of the total item variance. In accordance with
the factor analysis, the variables monitoring and coordination are ob-
tained by summing three provisions associated with monitoring and
five provisions associated with coordination.
Table 1
Contractual orientations (promax factor pattern).a






Supervision of the licensee’s products by the licensor 12.3% 0.91 −0.22
Supervision of the licensee’s industrial and R&D installations by the licensor 9.43% 0.61 0.49
Reporting the results of technical and commercial tests undertaken by the licensee to the licensor 16.0% 0.54 0.33
Training of the licensee’s personnel by the licensor 23.6% −0.19 0.78
Transfer of technical improvements made by the licensor to the licensee 14.2% 0.01 0.90
Licensee’s use of the licensor’s trademark 56.6% 0.47 0.67
Transfer of marketing test data and other commercial data from the licensor to the licensee 42.5% 0.14 0.78
Technical assistance and consultancy services provided by the licensor to the licensee 56.6% −0.35 0.69
Eigenvalue 1.58 3.81
Proportion of variance explained 0.20 0.48
Bold print indicates the largest factor loadings for each contract dimension.
a N= 106.
6 Four firms described two licensing exchanges, three firms described three licensing
exchanges, and two firms described four licensing exchanges.
V. Duplat et al. Research Policy 47 (2018) 1096–1110
1101
3.2.4. Technology-based and exchange attributes
A first category of variables captures the technological character-
istics of the licensing exchange. First, we consider the tacitness of the
transferred technology and measure it using a scale adapted from
Simonin (1999, 2004). The two survey questions investigated whether:
(i) the licensed technology was easily codified (e.g., in blueprints, in-
structions or formulas) and (ii) the licensed technology was more ex-
plicit (i.e., easy to explain and describe to others) than tacit. These two
items were recorded on a five-point Likert scale ranging from one
(“Strongly disagree”) to five (“Strongly agree”) and reverse-coded.
Cronbach’s alpha for this scale is 0.81. Tacitness should impact both the
occurrence of opportunism and the difficulties of collaborating. Tacit
knowledge is difficult to legally protect from unintended leakage
(Oxley, 1997; Teece, 1986). It also tends to be difficult to communicate
to an outside firm (Rosenkopf et al., 2001). Given their technical ex-
pertise and the flexibility of the proceeding, arbitrators should be better
equipped than public judges to assess the extent, content and value of
the tacit knowledge involved in a dispute (e.g., Arnold et al., 1991).
Second, we include the specific investments made by the licensee. To
compute this variable, we used three survey questions (Artz and Brush,
2000; Reuer and Ariño, 2007): (i) whether the technical skills required
for the licensing partnership were unique, (ii) the difficulty the licensee
would have in redeploying the people and facilities serving the licensing
partnership for other uses, and (iii) the licensee’s non-recoverable in-
vestments. Respondents were asked to use five-point Likert scales ran-
ging from “Not at all” to “To a great extent” for the first item, and from
“Negligible” to “Substantial” for the second and third items. Cronbach’s
alpha is 0,73. These investments are sunk costs that require enhanced
contractual safeguards and remedies due to risks of hold-up (Artz and
Brush, 2000). The specificity of these investments should favor dispute-
resolution mechanisms, like arbitration, that preserve the continuity of
the exchange beyond disputes (Lumineau and Oxley, 2012; Williamson,
1985). Third, we include a variable named observability of the licensee’s
behavior, which focuses on whether the licensor could easily: (i) monitor
and control the performance of the licensee in terms of royalties, sales, or
production volume, and (ii) monitor and control how the licensee uses
the licensor’s proprietary knowledge. The items were measured using
five-point Likert-type scales ranging from “Strongly disagree” to
“Strongly agree.” The Cronbach alpha coefficient is 0.88. When it is
difficult to observe counterparties’ contribution, non-disclosure of in-
formation is likely to occur either purposefully or otherwise (Williamson,
1985). As shown in previous studies, contractual provisions tend be more
extensive when behaviors are difficult to verify (e.g., Alchian and
Demsetz, 1972). The expertise of the arbitrators as well as their ability to
rely on business trends, norms and customs for judging the fairness of
firms’ practices or the quality of outputs should be highly valued when
observability is limited (Bernstein, 2001). Fourth, in order to assess the
technological capabilities required by the licensor to develop the technology,
we used the following item: to develop this technology, the licensor had
to invest significantly in experienced and trained skilled human resources
(Simonin, 1999). Respondents were asked to use a five-point Likert scale
ranging from “Not at all” to “To a great extent.” Harhoff and Reitzig
(2004) state that the exposure of patented technology to opposition is
more likely if the patent right is perceived to be a weak one with respect
to its degree of novelty or its inventive step. When skills and capabilities
at the root of the technology developed are highly valuable and unique,
there is less chance of related-patents being exposed to opposition
(Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2001). The licensee tends to be more
willing to make the required investments if the risks that the product or
service using the patented technology is withdrawn from the market
remain limited. The resulting secured setting and the expected gains may
form the basis for collaboration and lead to extensive use of amicable
dispute-resolution mechanisms like arbitration.
The next two technology-based variables relate to the character-
istics of the licensing transaction itself. We first control for the ex-
clusivity of the licensing exchange. To measure exclusivity, we use a
dummy variable that is equal to one if the licensee is granted mono-
polistic use of the technology within a territory or field of use, and for a
certain time period. It is zero otherwise.7 The granting of exclusivity
rights is the most critical hostage mechanism used in the licensing
context (Aulakh et al., 2010; Somaya et al., 2010). Given the damages
associated with early termination of an exclusive license, one might
expect mutual adjustments to take place when disturbances surface.
Furthermore, thanks to the restriction on the number of licensees, the
licensor should more easily monitor the licensee’s actions (Aulakh et al.,
2010) and be less burdened by dealing with potential competition be-
tween licensees coexisting in the same territory (Arora and Fosfuri,
2003). Public ordering should here be perceived as more suitable for
preventing or handling possible disputes that cannot be contained in-
ternally despite the exclusivity granted. Opting for the public court and
its severe sanctions may dissuade counter-productive actions and ward
off disputes that could not be accommodated internally and amicably.
We also control for the license’s scope by computing a variable equal to
one when joint efforts in manufacturing or marketing are expected, to
two when joint manufacturing and marketing efforts are both expected,
and to zero otherwise. These scope decisions have important implica-
tions for the extent to which licensing partners expose valuable mar-
keting- or manufacturing-related knowledge and know-how to each
other (Hagedoorn et al., 2008; Oxley and Sampson, 2004). The extent of
coordination and more intimate face-to-face contact necessary to
achieve success increases (Gulati and Singh, 1998; Kogut and Zander,
1992) and uncertainty raises the costs of monitoring and assessing
partners’ behavior (Pisano, 1989). Due to these in-depth interlinkages,
arbitrators might be better equipped than public judges to understand
the issues at hand (Bonn, 1972; Hagedoorn and Hesen, 2009). More-
over, in embedded licensing more than in standard licensing, a prospect
of partnership continuity beyond possible disputes should play a posi-
tive role in favoring amicable resolution of conflicts.
Our final technology-based variable corresponds to the patent-rights
index developed by Park (2008). Since all respondent firms were located
in Belgium and the respondents were licensees or licensors, we opt to
include the index in the licensing partners’ – rather than respondent firms’
– country. This is equivalent to accounting for the distance between
Belgian partners and foreign partners in terms of institutional quality for
international deals. A low patent-rights index tends to trigger more op-
portunism and contractual hazards in licensing as it makes it easier to
develop peripheral technology (Aulakh et al., 2013; Hennart, 1991). In
weakly protective environments with poor patent right indexes, opting for
an arbitration forum enables to secure fair and efficient resolution of
disputes and to prevent knowledge misappropriation (Leeson, 2008). It
offers the opportunity to engineer ex ante transparent, detailed, and
commonly understood rules that permit partners to achieve clarity about
enforcement ex post as well as mitigate perceptions of unfairness.
Besides the technology-based variables listed above, we also include
exchange-specific characteristics found in prior research to be key
drivers for contractual and dispute-resolution decisions. First, we in-
clude a variable that captures the collaborative history between licen-
sing partners. Prior ties is a dummy variable set equal to one when the
partners had ties prior to the described license. It is set equal to zero in
the absence of a prior tie or when the option “I don’t know” was se-
lected.8 In line with prior studies (e.g., Gulati, 1995; Uzzi, 1997), we
expect that these ties will mitigate coordination and monitoring
7 As a robustness check, we create a categorical variable named specific investments
made by the licensor, which takes the value of zero if the license is non-exclusive (66.0%),
of one if the license is exclusive and the licensor’s technological capabilities remain below
its mean value of 3 (15.1%), and of two if the license is exclusive and the licensor’s
technological capabilities are greater than its mean value of 3 (18.9%). The results remain
stable, as explained in footnote 9.
8 As a robustness check, we ran the regressions without including observations in
which the option “I don’t know” was selected (i.e., 15 observations). We obtain similar
results which are available upon request.
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concerns thanks to the trust generated and the routines developed.
Overall, the existence of prior ties should reduce the occurrence of
disputes. By opting for dilatory tactics, partners would indeed risk the
loss of the idiosyncratic and collaborative routines they developed to-
gether over time (Pisano, 1989). It is likely that, in order to foster the
bilateral method for handling disputes or to avoid dilatory tactics, li-
censing partners prefer litigation over arbitration. The threat of severe
sanctions imposed by public courts can dissuade counter-productive
actions and disputes that could not be accommodated internally despite
the existence of prior ties.
Second, we asked respondents whether their firm and the licensing
partner firm belonged to the same sector. The values for this variable,
same sector, are equal either to zero (i.e., different sector) or one (i.e.,
same sector). Although belonging to the same sector might ease inter-
partner coordination, it simultaneously exacerbates the monitoring re-
quirements to avoid unintended leakage by direct competitors
(Hagedoorn et al., 2008; Oxley and Sampson, 2004). Severe sanctions
delivered by public courts should be preferred to amicable rules for
preventing or resolving disputes that arise along the way between
competitors.
Third, we account for the legal assistance provided by external ex-
perts during the contractual-design phase. Our variable, legal assistance,
is set equal to one if firms used experts with legal and technical ex-
pertise in contractual or IP matters when negotiating their licensing
contracts. It is set equal to zero otherwise. These experts are likely to
positively influence their clients’ propensity to resolve disputes pri-
vately through arbitration (Sampson, 2003). They tend to resort to
approaches that, they believe, will ensure the greatest degree of control
over process and results, and the least likelihood of a disastrous out-
come for their clients. If the worst case does happen, those experts must
be able to cover themselves by justifying the choice they made
(Stipanowich, 2014). Fourth, we consider the heterogeneity in licensing
firms’ ability to craft and engage in partnership contracts (Kale et al.,
2002). In order to proxy the level of internal capabilities, we use in-
formation about the size of the licensors. Prior research on technology
partnerships has made use of this size measure to predict the propensity
to engage in cooperation (e.g., Harrigan, 1988; Lokshin et al., 2011) and
to assess the ability to maintain partnership stability (Osborn and
Baughn, 1990). Larger firms have more abundant resources (including
legal resources) (Bagley, 2008) and should run a lower risk of losing
control over their proprietary knowledge (Hagedoorn et al., 2008). If,
despite these internal capabilities, disputes arise, larger licensors may
be more inclined to prefer a strongly sanctioning forum to settle the
dispute. To compute this variable, we assign licensor firms to one of five
categories based on the number of employees: (i) 100 or fewer em-
ployees; (ii) between 101 and 250 employees; (iii) between 251 and
500 employees; (iv) between 501 and 1000 employees; and (v) more
than 1000 employees.
Finally, we capture possible regulatory changes over time that may
hinder or encourage arbitration (Stipanowich and Lamare, 2014) by
controlling for the license’s age. Based on the year of negotiation of the
licensing contracts, we create three main categories: up to two years;
between three and ten years; and older than ten years. The legal lit-
erature is quite expansive concerning the changes in either arbitration
or litigation procedures over time (e.g., Stipanowich and Lamare,
2014). These preferences and trends may in turn influence our pre-
dictions.
In order to properly specify our model, we also include three in-
strumental variables in the first-stage equations. The instrument arm’s-
length licensing is included in the monitoring equation. This variable
equals one if the licensing partner is located in Belgium or the
Netherlands, and zero otherwise. Geographical proximity limits travel
time and costs and so can ease the monitoring of exchanges (Berry
et al., 2010). In particular, it facilitates the observation of counterparts’
behaviors and the implementation of formal monitoring processes. We
do not expect geographical proximity to influence the two other
independent variables. Rather than the geographical distance between
the licensing partners’ countries, it is the quality of their institutional
environment (such as the patent-rights index) which influences the
preference for arbitration over litigation. In order to avoid navigating
through a foreign court system that does not guarantee fair processes,
licensing partners may agree to refer their potential disputes to an ar-
bitral forum (e.g., Dasgupta, 2003; Lew, 2009; Roth, 2006). Nor do we
expect any influence of the arm’s length variable on the requirement for
more or fewer coordination provisions; the reasons for obtaining more
coordination provisions are rooted in firms’ cognitive capabilities re-
quired by the transaction itself and the nature of the technology
transferred.
We include in the coordination equation a measure of technology
intensity for identification purposes. Our variable is set equal to one if
the respondent firm falls into a low-tech service-based sector, two into a
low-or medium-tech manufacturing sector, three into a high-tech
manufacturing sector, and four into a knowledge-intensive service-
based sector. We use the Statistical Classification of Economic Activities
in the European Community (NACE) Rev. 2 codes (two-digit level) for
the respondent firms’ sectors. This measure refers to the likelihood of
improvements in technology, rendering the licensed technology ob-
solete (Robertson and Gatignon, 1998). Contingency planning and well-
crafted coordination mechanisms that specify, for instance, the content
and schedule of inter-partner communication enable partners to more
efficiently absorb external changes (Vlaar et al., 2007). We do not ex-
pect the obsolescence rate of the technology to affect the choice be-
tween arbitration and public courts. Rather than the technology in-
tensity, it is the industry itself and its patent trends which we believe
influence the need for monitoring and arbitration decisions. Depending
on the industries, new products may or may not comprise numerous,
separately patentable elements. If the product is simple – i.e., based on
relatively few and independent patentable elements, even if very high-
tech – it will be associated with easy protection. The effectiveness of
patents differs across industries and technical fields (e.g., Lanjouw and
Schankerman, 2001).
Finally, the variable third assistance in identifying a licensing partner is
included in the first-stage equation aimed at predicting the extent of
coordination provisions. When firms search for assistance from third
parties in selecting licensing partners, they value the ability of those
third parties to obtain information through their network position.
They also value their ability to combine all the information obtained to
craft promising and original collaboration projects (Hargadon and
Sutton, 1997; Walsh and Ungson, 1991). Such third parties solicited at
the outset of collaboration tend to emphasize the need for coordination
routines and for accurate expectations with regard to the skills and
efforts to be deployed (Daft, 1978; Weick, 1976). These third parties are
not expected to influence the extent of monitoring provisions or the
choice in favor of arbitration. Advice on the choice between arbitration
and litigation is sought at a later contractual stage. Also, given the
backgrounds, roles and functions of the third parties at the outset of
collaborations, it is unlikely that they emphasize the control and
monitoring side of possible collaborations (Bercovitz and Tyler, 2014).
Three tests are performed to ascertain the statistical reliability of
our three instruments. First, the Amemiya-Lee-Newey test for over-
identification is performed on the variable coordination since we count
two instruments for a single instrumented variable. The test does not
reject the null hypothesis (i.e., valid instrument) (p-value= 0.70).
Second, the Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistics, used as a test for under-
identification, is obtained for monitoring as the model counts one single
instrument for this instrumented variable. The test does not reject the
null hypothesis (i.e., instrument is valid) (p-value= 0.32). Third, the
weak-instruments problem arises when the correlation between the
endogenous regressors and the excluded instruments are nonzero but
small. In order to ascertain that this problem of weak identification is
not present, we use the “rule of thumb” of Staiger and Stock (1994)
according to which the F-statistics should be at least 10. The Cragg-
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Donald Wald F-statistics in our case are 12.5 and 12.6 respectively for
coordination and monitoring.
4. Results
We report the number of observations, means, standard deviations
and minimum and maximum values for the variables included in the
regression models in Tables 2 and 3.
Overall, 27.4% of the licensing contracts in our sample include an
arbitration provision. This percentage is consistent with the corre-
sponding figures reported by Eisenberg and Miller (2007), as well as
those reported by Anderson and Dekker (2005). The likelihood of
finding an arbitration provision is particularly low in domestic licensing
(12.5%), while it is 25.5% in Europe (excluding Belgium), and 34.5%
and 28.6% when North American and Japanese partners are involved
respectively. In the international setting, arbitration may offer a “neu-
tral” forum such as the International Court of Arbitration or the
American Arbitration Association.
Table 4 presents five CMP regression models in which the depen-
dent variables are monitoring and coordination in the first-stage
equations, and arbitration in the second-stage equation. Model I cor-
responds to the baseline model. It estimates the direct effects of trans-
action and exchange attributes on monitoring, coordination and arbi-
tration simultaneously. In Model II and Model III, contractual
orientations are introduced individually in the arbitration equation. In
Model IV, the two contractual orientations – monitoring and co-
ordination – are included in the second-stage equation. After control-
ling for the direct effects of transaction and exchange attributes on
arbitration, findings obtained in this model support one of our first two
hypotheses (Model IV in Table 4). Hypothesis 1, which predicts a ne-
gative relationship between the extent of the monitoring orientation
and the likelihood of including an arbitration provision, does not re-
ceive support. Hypothesis 2, which covers the positive effect of an ex-
tensive coordination orientation on partner firms’ propensity to include
an arbitration provision, is supported (β=0.51; p< 0.05).
In order to test our third hypothesis, we examine the interactive
effect of monitoring and coordination provisions on the occurrence of
arbitration. We explore whether and how the presence of coordination
provisions affects the relationship between monitoring provisions and
arbitration, and whether and how monitoring provisions influence the
coordination provisions-arbitration relationship. As shown in Model V
in Table 4, the significant interaction effect suggests that the marginal
effect of monitoring orientation is dependent on the extent of
coordination orientation and vice versa (β=0.39; p< 0.05). This last
finding is supported by the figure below (Fig. 1). It illustrates that with
a greater extent of monitoring provisions, the positive relationship
between coordination and arbitration increases. When the coordination
orientation is negligible, however, the monitoring provisions tend to
reduce the occurrence of arbitration provisions in our sample.
Overall, our models gain in robustness when the coordination or-
ientation is added in the second-stage equation aimed at predicting the
occurrence of arbitration provisions (i.e., Wald Chi2 is higher). As far as
the atanh-rho coefficients are concerned, a significant coefficient im-
plies that common unobserved factors tend to increase errors for both
equations. In other words, the unobserved factors influencing the de-
pendent variables are correlated. In all our models, the atanh-rho
coefficients are not statistically significant (Table 4). Besides the atanh-
rho, the Wald test of exogeneity also reveals that the null hypotheses –
monitoring and coordination may be treated as exogenous – cannot be
rejected (p-value=0.16 for monitoring, p-value=0.20 for coordina-
tion).
Compared to the linear OLS estimation, probit coefficients shown in
Table 4 require cautious interpretation due to the non-linearity of
probit models (Ai and Norton, 2003; Hoetker, 2007). Marginal effects
tell how much a change in an independent variable changes the prob-
ability of the focal outcome (i.e., of including an arbitration provision),
while the other variables remain unchanged. Results for the marginal
effects obtained for Model IV reveal that an increase in the extent of
coordination provisions by one standard deviation from its mean leads
to an increase in the probability of having arbitration in licensing
contracts by 13.3% (p< 0.05) on average with the other covariates
held at observed sample values. Concerning the interaction effect ob-
tained from Model V, holding coordination constant for every value of
monitoring between 0 and 3, we observe that the marginal effects of
coordination (where coordination is at its mean) respectively reach
11.1% (p< 0.10) when monitoring equals zero, 15.3% (p< 0.01) when
monitoring equals one, 16.3% (p< 0.01) when monitoring equals two
and 16.5% (p< 0.05) when monitoring equals three. The pattern of
marginal effects supports the positive moderating effect.
The results for several of the control variables included in the
second-stage equation are notable. In the full model (Model V in
Table 4), it appears first that, as expected, when exclusivity rights are
granted, public ordering prevails for adjudicating disputes that cannot
be contained internally despite the presence of critical mutual hostages
(β=−1.05; p<0.05).9 Second, a shared history of collaborations
tends to reduce the likelihood of opting for arbitration (β=−1.72;
p< 0.01). Third, licensing partners from the same sectors are less in-
clined to prefer arbitration over public ordering (β=−0,61; p< 0.05).
This finding also supports our expectations. Finally, legal assistance
from expert third parties increases the likelihood of an arbitration
provision (β=0.99; p< 0.05). Lawyers may encourage firms to avoid
public litigation and instead favor private dispute-resolution mechan-
isms (Lumineau and Oxley, 2012).
5. Discussion and conclusions
In this study, we investigated firms’ decisions to include or exclude
arbitration provisions when they negotiate inter-organizational and
market-based contracts. We primarily aimed at understanding why,
despite the numerous advantages of the arbitration mechanism over
public litigation, managers do not seem to consider this private
Table 2
Descriptive statistics.a
Mean STD Min Max
1. Arbitration 0.27 0.45 0 1
2. Monitoring 0.38 0.68 0 3
3. Coordination 1.93 1.49 0 5
4. Tacitness 3.48 1.11 1 5
5. Specific investment 3.32 0.98 1 5
6. Observability 3.41 1.11 1 5
7. Technological capabilities 3.41 1.25 1 5
8. Exclusivity 0.34 0.48 0 1
9. License’s Scope 0.25 0.49 0 2
10. Patent-rights index 4.51 0.53 2.2 4.88
11. Prior ties 0.16 0.37 0 1
12. Same sector 0.74 0.44 0 1
13. Legal assistance 0.35 0.48 0 1
14. Licensor’s size 2.74 1.76 1 5
15. License age 1.82 0.66 1 3
16. Arm's-length licensing 0.15 0.36 0 1
17. Technology intensity 2.09 0.93 1 4
18. Third assistance 0.07 0.27 0 1
a N=106.
9 After replacing our variables technological capabilities and exclusivity by the alternative
variable specific investments made by the licensor in our models, we do not notice changes in
the findings. More precisely, this computed variable does not significantly influence the
extent of monitoring and coordination provisions included in the licensing contract. It
does however negatively influence the occurrence of an arbitration provision (p< 0.01).
This latter result supports the findings obtained while considering the variable exclusivity
alone.
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mechanism as a “default” option. To this end, we considered the role
played by both coordination and monitoring orientations adopted by
corporate decision-makers when drafting licensing contracts. On the
basis of data on technology licensing, we found that the occurrence of
an arbitration provision increases when contracts emphasize a co-
ordination orientation that reflects an extant requirement for joint ef-
forts and task interdependency ex post. We did not find, however, that
the occurrence of arbitration provisions, when considered alone, de-
creases when the monitoring orientation included for deterring moral
hazards is non-negligible. At this stage, we admit that our results sug-
gest that the information brought about by monitoring can probably
favor both public courts and arbitration to the same extent. The joint
effect of monitoring and coordination orientations suggests, indeed,
that partners perceive arbitration as better suited than public ordering
for handling and preventing disputes when both types of provisions are
extensive. In accordance with our theoretical predictions, these results
imply that we must consider the complex architecture of contractual
governance (Faems et al., 2008; Malhotra and Lumineau, 2011) if we
wish to understand the decision-making process behind choices of
dispute-resolution mechanisms.
Our main contribution relates to the comparative approach for the
choice of dispute-resolution mechanisms. In their seminal contribu-
tions, Macneil (1974, 1978) and Williamson (1985, 1991) state that
distinct governance modes require distinct ordering systems for their
efficient execution and enforcement. They explain the discrepancies
characterizing these systems (i.e., classical, neoclassical, and for-
bearance), and the reasons why each system may or may not be suited
for enforcing and facilitating generic governance modes (i.e., market,
hybrid, and internal organization). Rather than considering broad ca-
tegories of governance, we propose a more refined approach by dis-
tinguishing among the monitoring and coordination characteristics of
governance modes. Our findings support this fine-grained approach and
reveal that public ordering is preferred in simple and discrete exchanges
where there are no significant relations to be preserved beyond disputes
and public judges can strictly apply the letter of the original contract.
On the other hand, arbitration corresponds to a trilateral “governance”
mechanism that fosters the re-alignment of interests and objectives
following disputes. Arbitration is preferred in exchanges characterized
by a non-negligible need for coordination. Consequently, our results
show that the trade-offs that take place when opting for either public or
private ordering tend to parallel the two key impediments to coopera-
tion: the threat of exploitation and the possibility of coordination fail-
ures.
Furthermore, we extend nascent research related to the joint effect













































































































































































Fig. 1. Joint effect of monitoring and coordination orientations on the like-
lihood of arbitration provisions.
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on subsequent decisions. We observe in practice a high occurrence of
highly coordinative licensing exchanges in which both orientations are
prevalent. Findings reveal an interesting interactive effect from which
we can infer the influence of monitoring and coordination on one an-
other in the choice of dispute-resolution mechanisms. They show that
monitoring provisions magnify firms’ inclination to prefer the arbitral
forum over public courts in the presence of extensive coordination
provisions. This suggests that monitoring – and more broadly control –
provisions may be used as a means to ease and support collaboration
rather than as coercive solutions (Gulati and Singh, 1998). The presence
of clearly articulated monitoring terms may inspire the confidence
needed for close collaboration (Baker et al., 1994). By aligning interests
thanks to enhanced monitoring activities, licensing partners may be
more willing to closely collaborate and to overcome their cognitive
limitations. This finding tends to highlight the different functions and
roles of monitoring provisions along with the nature of the partnership.
Prior research on arbitration provisions in franchising suggests a posi-
tive relationship between monitoring and the use of litigation (Antia
et al., 2013; Drahozal and Hylton, 2003). Monitoring may therefore
serve as a coercive tool. In licensing however, the need for coordination
over time is likely to be comparatively more extensive than in fran-
chising. In essence, technology licensing contracts are inherently in-
complete due to the extent of tacit knowledge, the difficulties of pro-
tecting IP, or the uncertainty and contingencies surrounding the
commercialization and implementation of non-proprietary technology.
Monitoring might then help to support the needed coordination in more
relational licensing exchanges.
Our study therefore complements recent research that distinguishes
the control functions of contractual agreements from their coordination
functions (e.g., Gulati and Singh, 1998) by exploring the manner in
which alternative ordering systems are expected to empower contracts.
We also contribute to the trilateral “governance” concept introduced by
Williamson (1979). Williamson (1979, p. 237) notes that “… third-
party assistance in resolving disputes and evaluating performance often
has advantages over litigation in serving these functions of flexibility
and gap filling…” Thus far, the assistance provided by third parties has
been understudied (Nooteboom, 1999). Our study provides theoretical
and empirical insights into when arbitrators are perceived as necessary
active gap fillers and amicable arrangers. Our arguments therefore
follow Buchanan (1975, p. 229), who suggests that the arbitrator is “…
the outsider who tries to work out compromises among conflicting
claims…”Williamson (1985, p. 193) also argues that the arbitrator is an
“institutional design specialist.” By opting for arbitration and trilateral
governance ex ante, strategic decision-makers gain ex post the proce-
dural flexibility that contractual gaps demand and avoid too much ri-
gidity (Macneil, 1978). Arbitration can be viewed as an “external”
administrative apparatus used for settling disputes in coordinative
market-based exchanges.
Finally, we complement the legal literature on arbitration. Cooter
and Rubinfeld (1989) and Stipanowich (2014) point out the differences
between the interests of lawyers and those of their clients in most legal
disputes. While building on the legal literature and its demonstration of
the advantages and disadvantages of private and public dispute re-
solution, we offer a synthetic, testable framework rooted in transaction
cost economics logic, and driven by corporate decision-makers’ con-
cerns and considerations: Si Vis Pacem, Para Bellum. The selection of the
dispute-resolution forum is a strategic tool that can be used either for
dissuasion if the chosen forum acts as a credible threat against oppor-
tunistic behaviors, or as a signal of partners’ willingness to “work things
out.” By adopting the transaction as the unit of analysis, rather than
performing cross-country or cross-industry analyses as is usually done
in legal studies, we provide further insights into managers’ reluctance
to rely on arbitration. Given the risk at stake when engaging in inter-
firm partnerships, arbitration cannot be depicted as “the” optimal dis-
pute-resolution mechanism to use under any circumstances.
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